Response to Glider and Juha.

[Bill Walker]

And what was the net result of destroying this bridge? Germany was defeated maybe a day or two later?

This story reminds me very much of some recent reading on the German night fighter force. It glorified and catered to a small number of highly skilled and successful pilots, giving them individual aircraft modifications, first choice of interception areas, etc. The end result was some very impressive statistics for the individual pilots, but not for the night fighter force as a whole. This kind of approach had some benefit in the very short campaigns the Germans fought early in the war, but was self-defeating in the protracted struggle that the war became. In the end this handful of highly capable individuals was overwhelmed by masses of average aircrew (no disrespect meant) flying masses of average aircraft. I think this is part of of what Six Nifty 50s was referring to in his mention of a "cost/benefit analysis". Given the choice of developing highly skilled individuals (and aircraft to suit them) or producing masses of average aircrew in average aircraft, the Allies made one choice, and the Germans made another. History tells us who was correct.

It is obvious that the Allies quickly realized that this was to be a long war, and adopted training and equipment philosophies to suit this. The Germans realized this too late, if at all. In my opinion, looking at this underlying difference in philosophies does far more to explain differences in equipment fielded and tactics used by the two air forces than talking about "Tribalism" amongst senior officers.

[Kutscha]

"On Oct 5 1943 dive bombing was officially abandoned with the Stukageschwaders being redesignated to Schlachtgeschwaders and commited almost exclusively to the low level ground attack role."

The now useless dive brakes were often removed.

[MarkRS]

From this interesting article on dive bombers:

http://www.australianflying.com.au/n...e-bomber-myths


"By the time the Trumpets of Jericho (Jericho-Trompeten - dive sirens) were being discussed in the Allied press, they had had their heyday and were being phased out due to their lack of surprise effect and because of drag."

The Ju-87 probably lost its air brakes for the same reason, to reduce drag. The faster you dive, the faster you come out of the dive, making you less of a target.

[Bill Walker]

Originally Posted by MarkRS

The faster you dive, the faster you come out of the dive,...

Basic physics shows things are not this simple. At a constant maximum g load (set by the design of the aircraft and the physical limits of the pilot) the radius of the pull up maneuver goes up as the square of any speed increase. In other words, a 20% increase in speed through the pull up requires a 44% bigger radius. The actual length along the arc (from start of pull up to when the aircraft resumes straight line flight) goes up linearly with the radius. So, the aircraft has a 44% longer curved flight path, flown at only 20% greater speed. Time during the pull out (when the aircraft is lowest, flight path is most predicable, and therefore the AA gunner's job is easiest) is thus increased. Also, if the aircraft releases the bomb before the pull up starts, for greatest accuracy, the minimum release altitude has to increase (to keep the low point in the pull up arc above the ground).

Dive brakes were intended to limit the aircraft to some maximum speed in the dive. This gives some "hang time", allowing the pilot to adjust the aim point and release at some optimum altitude without worrying about airspeed during the dive and pull up. If the dive brakes are removed, dive bombing tactics become very different. No dive brakes means no more "traditional" (i.e. very steep) dive bombing.

Added in edit: The drag of the sirens was present at all phases of flight, limiting both maximum speed and range with a given payload (or payload over a given range).

[Kryten]

Spitfire pilots operating in close support were trained to bomb in a dive, as were Typhoon and Hurricane pilots as far as I recall, whilst not dedicated dive bombers diving at the angles of a Stuka would this explain the RAF not operating purpose built aircraft in this role?
Interstingly Adrian Warburton "Warby" used a Maryland to dive bomb an Italian ship off Malta!

[Juha]

Hello Tony
Yefim Gordon's and Sergey Komissarov’s Il-2 and Il-10 book has lot of pictures but also a fair amount of text. But be careful on its combat narrative sections, info is based on old Soviet info and attack results given are many times optimistic sometimes wildly so. I liked Oleg Rastrenin’s Il-2 book in Osprey’s Combat A/C series. He has written also proper books on the subject.

On German sources, unfortunately my most serious interest on German units are/were 1st-7th, 11th and 12th PzDs, of which only 2nd and 11th fought also in West during the later part of the war.
There is a unit history on 2nd PzD, but I haven’t see it. There is also a unit history on the A/T battalion of the div, Friedens- und Kriegslebnisse einer Generation. Schweinfurt (1961?). I read the book a couple decades ago but IIRC it was a better unit history. On 11th PzD I have only see a pictorial history and a couple articles on its retreat along Rhone Valley during Aug 44.

One more which comes to my mind is Wolfgang Vopersal’s Soldaten, Kämpfer Kameraden. It is a unit history of 3rd SS Div Totenkopf. I was very positively surprised when I read the Band III (1987) on the battles fought during summer 43 and Band IVa on the battles fought during Autumn 43. The div fought only in the Eastern front after 1941 but the books seemed to give a realistic picture on the war in the East.

The German books mentioned off course concentrated on ground war but they mentioned also effects of air attacks.

Now I must stop.

HTH
Juha

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

You ask, Glider, what I mean by 'accuracy'.

My answer is identical to that given by Squadron Leader Arthur Murland Gill of 84 Squadron RAF (who experienced operating Blenheims and Vengeances) when interviewed by Peter C Smith;
"Dive-bombing with the Vengeance in Burma taught us what it meant to be accurate. For example, to take out vital bridges, I could usually send a couple of Vengeances in with the almost guaranteed certainty that the bridge would be demolished, whereas with the Blenheim I could take the squadron against the same target day after day and rarely, if ever, score a hit."

Tony

Another small point, but I didn't question accuracy of dive bombers, they were very accurate.

However regards this posting we are not questioning the accuracy of a dive bomber vs a Blenhiem, what would be interesting is a comparison of a dive bomber vs a Typhoon or a P47. Vengeances were replaced by the P47 in RAF service presumably for good reasons and one of those would be that the Fighter Bomber had a good enough accuracy, maybe not as good as a Dive Bomber but good enough.

[glider1]

I also notice that he was shot down six times, lucky man and that was against the Russian Forces.

[Bill Walker]

Kryten, the term "dive bombing" has had several meanings through the years. In these threads Tcolvin appears to stick to the original narrow sense of the term: releasing the bomb from a vertical or very nearly vertical dive. This tactic was developed in the 1920s and 1930s, and theoretically gave great accuracy. On the other hand, aircraft designed for this specific task were at a disadvantage in terms of payload and maneuverability, and the maneuver, once understood by the enemy, gave lots of opportunities for opposing AA gunners and fighters.

You will find the term used loosely from WW2 up to today to describe any tactic where the bomb is released in a dive, even from fairly shallow angles. Don't get hung up on the words, you need to understand what the aircraft was actually doing in order to follow this discussion. I think most 2 TAF "dive bombing" was at angles of 30 to 45 degrees below the horizon. This gave less accuracy, but afforded the aircraft a wider range of approach options, and was a maneuver possible for fighter aircraft, as opposed to pure dive bombers like a Stuka. This meant the 2 TAF could use true multi-role fighters, that could also do strafing and rocket attacks, and hold their own in air-to-air combat. As the Luftwaffe learned in the Battle of Britain, a true dive bomber is a "one trick pony".

It is interesting to note that allmost all the 2 TAF "dive bombing" was done in aircraft originally designed as interceptors: the Spitfire and the Typhoon. Some here suggest this resulted from ignorance or deliberate hostility to other branches by senior RAF staff. I personally believe that it is more a reflection of the tough decisions made at all levels in the Allied government and military on the allocation of finite resources amongst a large number of competing demands. Like any compromise, somebody always looses, at least relatively. A similar trade off had to be made with large aircraft and their trained crews going to Bomber Command or Coastal Command, generating alot of unresolved questions over the years. Rather than lengthy discussions of "what could have been" (which can never be truly resolved) we should be looking at the overall outcome of the trade offs made on both sides. In most wars it is not "the best side" that wins, but the "least bad side".

[Bill Walker]

Originally Posted by glider1

... what would be interesting is a comparison of a dive bomber vs a Typhoon or a P47. Vengeances were replaced by the P47 in RAF service presumably for good reasons and one of those would be that the Fighter Bomber had a good enough accuracy, maybe not as good as a Dive Bomber but good enough.

I agree. And the comparison should not just be on accuracy, but on the overall contribution to victory, and cost to the Allies, of each aircraft type. The purpose of the RAF was never just to destroy bridges, but to win the war with the available resources. Destroying bridges or any point target is only one part of a bigger task.