Direct Communication Between German Troops and LW Aircraft?

[Boomerang]

Gentlemen:

I don't know a lot about the Luftwaffe's flivos, but my understanding is that they did not communicate directly with aircraft, instead they forwarded information via LW channels, which was used to task pilots. Thus, they weren't Forward Air Controllers in the modern sense.

However, Joel Hayward's Stopped at Stalingrad, quotes the army's Wilhelm Tieke thus: 'Pilots talked to us over the radio...' i.e. direct communication between German ground forces and LW aircraft.

The reference relates to operations in the Caucasus in July/August 1942, the LW units belonged to Fliegerkorps IV, but the information is no more specific than that.

This report raises questions such as was this a one-off response to a fluid operational situation, what sort of radio equipment was used, what types of aircraft participated in this practice, etc.

Any comments would be very welcome.

Thanks

Don W

[Kari Lumppio]

Hello!

FuG 17 radio was able to keep contact between ground forces and airplane. I think reconnaissance versions of Bf 109 did have this radio. Camera equipment was less important. At least in the Nahaufklärungsgruppen.

Cheers,
Kari

[kalender1973]

Hi,

IIRC Richard Muller in his "German air war in Russia" (1992) claims also
that no direct radio link existed between ground forces(flivo) and planes.

The "Luftwaffe stopped at Stalingrad" appears as not very reliable source for me.

Best regards

[Boomerang]

Kari, Igor:

Thanks for your replies. I must say that your responses set out different views on the issue of direct radio contact between German ground forces and LW aircraft.

Any further comments would be much appreciated.

Don W

[odybvig]

The contact between aircraft and ground army units was regulated by: Merkblatt OKL Lw. Führungsstab,Ausb.Abt. Nr 2880/44 geh.v. 2611.44 "Der Fliegerleitoffisier (Schlacht).
I am not sure if this was a Lw Officer or a Army officer, but it was stressed that the army unit should educate their own if the "Flugleitoffizier" was out of area or lost. And this was regulated by: Merkblatt OKL Lw. Führungsstab, Ausb.Abt. Nr 2600/44 geh.v. Ia/Ausb. 24.9.44 "über Einsatz und ausbildung der Fliegerleitoffisier (Heer)

The Fliegerleitoffizier unit was:
Himself
one NCO (radiooperator)
two privates (radiooperator)
one Driver

Aircraft that could use this comunication was
Jagdverbände with Fug 16z
Schlachtfliegerverbände with Fug 16z
Zerstörerverbande with Fug 10
Nahaufklärer with Fug 16z and Fug 17

That means that at least from 1944 the German army had a Forward Air Controllers in their organisation

Best from Norway
Olve Dybvig

[Graham Boak]

I find this very interesting, for I'm not clear on how the tactics worked in 1940 without radio contact between the ground forces, the Henschels, and the Stukas. Without some such contact, the delays in calling for air support would seem to be at odds with the fast movement of the advance.

[Boomerang]

Olve:

Thank you for such an informative reply, you definitely have identified the process for direct communication between the flivos and LW aircraft, including the technical aspects of the radio links.

I dug out one of my DVDs, which includes what appears to a segment from the Deutsche Wochenschau, the scene shows radio operators in a command half-track type vehicle - the narration states that the radio operators are LW personnel tasked with providing information to Stukas of SG 2 supporting a local counter attack in the late summer of 1944 on the Eastern Front.

Graham: I agree with your comments, but my understanding is that there was no direct ground/air communication during the early war blitzkrieg campaigns. It would be fascinating to determine whether this was due to technical limitations, lack of interservice cooperation, simply an issue that was never considered, etc. Unfortunately, I've found it pretty difficult to locate informaton about the flivos.

Cheers

Don W

[edwest]

Here is a good article on the subject:


http://www.fourays.org/features_2005.../closeair2.htm



HTH,
Ed

[cproyston]

IIRC Martin Pegg's mighty Panzerjager details a ground-to-air signalling method using various arrangements of white panels to direct air-support too,
Chris

[Pieter H]

Hi,
I tend to disagree with the statements made that the germans lacked direct air-to-ground communication during the Blitzkrieg. Below is part of the section on Radio Communication from my manuscript:

As in so many aspects, the German approach was much more radical than of its adversaries. Of course French, British, Belgian and Dutch forces were also equipped with radio, but at a much lower level than the Wehrmacht. Across both Heer and Luftwaffe an extensive radio communication network was established, ranging from backbone links between divisional staffs down to short range links between tank platoon commanders and individual tanks. Although it goes to far to list all Funkgeräte (FuG, radio equipment) used, some of the most relevant types are listed below:

Aircraft-to-aircraft and air-to-ground (VHF, 42-58 MHz)

FuG 7 (Bf109, Hs126, …, SdKfz 232, 263, 251/3-Ausf.III ) Standard radio for battle field tactical radio communication.

FuG 5 (luft) (Pz.Befehlsw III, SdKfz 251/3-III) Extended frequency range 40-47 MHz

FuG 3 (Funktrupp of NachrichtenAbt.) Receiver only to monitor Luftwaffe radio traffic

Aircraft-to-aircraft (VHF, 23-25 MHz)

FuG 16 (He111, Ju88, … )

FuG 15 (Funktrupp of NachrichtenAbt.) Receiver only to monitor Luftwaffe radio traffic

Long distance (HF, 0.3-0.6 & 3-6 MHz)

FuG 10 (He111, Ju88, Do17, Bf110, …) 40W, using (dragged) wire antenna for communication with base. Telegraphy & telephony (500km range).

FuG 11 (SdKfz 232, 263, 251/3-Ausf.IV) 100W, 9m rod antenna. Link to divisional HQ

FuG 12 (SdKfz 232, 263, 251/3-Ausf.IV) 80W, wire frame antenna. Link to regimental HQ

FuG 8 (SdKfz 251/3-I,II) Earlier version, limited range 1-3 MHz

FuG 1, 4 Receiver only Tactical ground (VHF, 27-33 MHz) 2m rod antenna

FuG 5 (PzKpfw I-IV, PzBefehlsw 1,3, SdKfZ 221, 222, 231, 251) 10W, command tanks, reconnaissance armoured cars and some individual tanks

FuG 6 20W version

FuG 2 (PzKpfw I-IV) Receiver for individual tanks

Within each division the Nachrichten Abteilung (communication unit) was responsible for linking the commanders of the frontline batallions with the divisonal staff and, more to the rear, the Armeekorps staff. For ordinary infantry units these N.Abt. were transported by van and would take up more or less fixed positions. In Panzer Divisione, however, they needed to be as mobile as the advancing tank batallions, and the Funktrupp radio sections were thus equipped with specialized radio armoured cars, mostly SdKfZ 251/3 or SdKfZ 263. Both of these were modified versions of the basic SdKfZ 251 half track command car and the 8-wheeled SdKfZ 231, respectively. They contained a variety of radio’s, and there were even specialized versions for the different forms of radio traffic: division to frontline batallions and reconnaissance units, division to Armeekorps and division to Luftwaffe, using the appropriate FuG from the table. These armoured cars where easily recognizable from the large "tent frame" antenna over the full length of the car. For the long range communication with the FuG 11 a 9m long rod antenna would be extended.

The frontline units, both the reconnaissance units and the commanders of the tank batallions would be in constant radio communication with the divisional staff. The reconnaissance Aufklärungs Abteilung used a variety of older (like the SdKfz 221 and 222) or modern armoured cars (like the SdKfZ 231), each equipped with a FuG 5 or 6 UHF radio.

This data is collected from a variety of specialized sources on german radio communication during the war, but I have to admit it was quite a puzzle since information was very scattered, incomplete and partly contradictory. The table gives my best interpretation as an electronic engineer, but I'm looking forward to any suggestions for improvement.

So now to come back to the initial question:
In the modern sense of the word the Wehrmacht had no forward air controllers as we know them today, where on-the-spot individual controllers can directly communicate with overhead aircraft. But they had - compared to their allied opponents - an extremely short loop. So a Hs126 army co-operation plane could transmit its observations directly to the relevant divisional staff on the ground, which would in turn inform through the forward Nachrichten Abteilung the frontline tank batallion commanders. A matter of minutes. Reversely, ground units encountering unexpected opposition would issue through their regimental or divisional HQ a request for support to a Stuka unit that was patrollling overhead and waiting for instructions. It probably goes to far to claim that every ground unit was linked to Luftwaffe units in this way, but it was definitely the case for the Panzer spearheads.
The allies, in contrast, mostly relied on observations being scribbled on paper by the observers in their reconnaissance aircraft, which were then dropped from the air in or near the hopefully (but not always) correct ground force headquarters. On the ground most communication was through normal public telephone lines, which quickly became unreliable when things got worse. Only the backbone of the command structure had more reliable radio links. Overall this meant that the response time was in the order of many hours, and any request coming in towards the end of the afternoon would normally only result in some action by the next morning.

Look forward to any comments,

Pieter