Acceptable loss rates vs. pyrrhic victories?

[Felix C]

Have been reading regarding anti-shipping strikes in the Med. and ask if there was an acceptable loss rate/exchange rate for sinking a merchant ship or warship type.

Example being the strike which resulted in the loss of the transport Rohna expended eight He-177s. I guess at the time the Germans would have only believe they sunk a merchant ship, not also 1000 lives. So would one merchant ship be acceptable loss rate for eight aircraft?

I read where the Allies acknowledged an acceptable loss rate in heavy bomber strikes and so ask if the Ger/Ital powers had similar. I realize the Allied heavies were used strategically and a convoy strike is tactical. But I note the campaign on Malta and Med convoy strikes could be quantified in terms of how many sorties could be launched before the squadron was ineffective.

I guess that also leads to the next question if there was an operational resarch section established for extended fronts. I am thinking in terms of Malta which was repeatedly bombed and is a relatively small target. Was there a calculus done of how many bombers/sorties would be required to neutralize a specific target or targets?

[glider1]

I think its recognised that a long term loss ratio of around three percent is acceptable, however there are other times when the target is so important close to 100% losses are accepted.

I am not aware of any calculus done re bombers were needed to destroy a certain type of target but they do exist in a lot of armies for Artillery fire

[mjbollinger]

Your hypothesis about the Rohna is correct. The pilot who commanded the aircraft that achieved the hit on Rohna didn't learn of the implications of this strike until many years after the war.

It is doubtful the Luftwaffe considered the loss rates of II./KG 40 to be acceptable. The total losses due to enemy action ranged from 20% to 30% of available aircraft on a monthly basis during the months in which missions were flown. The 43% loss rate on the KMF-26 raid (Rohna) was one of four missions in which total losses exceeded 40%. BTW, nine aircraft were lost as a result of this mission: aircraft NN+QW (Wk Nr #535556) suffered an engine fire on take-off and was burnt out.

By coincidence I am meeting with the survivors of the attack on Rohna later today.

[Laurent Rizzotti]

An acceptable loss rate is one that allows your side to remain operational longer than the enemy.

With a loss rate of 40%, bomber units involved in Rhona attack will not be able to remain operational, while German commanders knew that their attacks won't stop Allied convoys going into Med, so I think this was not acceptable. And in spring 1944, the Ju 88 fighters operating over the Bay of Biscay were ordered to escort some convoy attack formation over the Med.

But on the other hand, if you compare the German losses (9 bombers and 8 crew) to the Allied losses reported by German crew (and so probably well above the real ones, both in number and size of ships hit and sunk: overclaiming is not limited to air-to-air battle), you can conclude that it was worth it. The fact is that German airmen continued to attack Allied convoys in the Med up to July 1944 despite heavy losses.

The fact is that despite the losses suffered, the Allied convoys were probably the best targets German bombers could find then in MTO, and so the most efficient way to use them (even if the raid in Bari was also successfull, but this success was not repeated in other attacks against ports).

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by Felix C

Have been reading regarding anti-shipping strikes in the Med. and ask if there was an acceptable loss rate/exchange rate for sinking a merchant ship or warship type.

Example being the strike which resulted in the loss of the transport Rohna expended eight He-177s. I guess at the time the Germans would have only believe they sunk a merchant ship, not also 1000 lives. So would one merchant ship be acceptable loss rate for eight aircraft?

I read where the Allies acknowledged an acceptable loss rate in heavy bomber strikes and so ask if the Ger/Ital powers had similar. I realize the Allied heavies were used strategically and a convoy strike is tactical. But I note the campaign on Malta and Med convoy strikes could be quantified in terms of how many sorties could be launched before the squadron was ineffective.

I guess that also leads to the next question if there was an operational resarch section established for extended fronts. I am thinking in terms of Malta which was repeatedly bombed and is a relatively small target. Was there a calculus done of how many bombers/sorties would be required to neutralize a specific target or targets?

From my point of view the anti-ship / anti-convoi operation are the kind of strategic operation or at least semi strategic. Even you paid a high price, you could solve the problem of strategic cutting of suppy lines (isolation of whole theater of operation) and prevent the reinforcment arrives on the front. The tanks on the ship deck are unprotected harmles piece of steel. If these tanks arrive on the front, there are the potential weapons which caused high losses by own people. The 1000 soldier on the landing ship are soft target, the 1000 soldier in their trenches are havy to fight. Therefore, even the anti-ship operation caused the highest loss rate for the atacking planes, the overal result will be positive, as with your sad sample: 1000 soldger vs 8 bomber crew.