Number of Luftwaffe sorties flown 22 June 1941

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

Ju 87 or destroyers Me 110 could done from 7-9 to 4-6 sorties a day, but Ju 87s was only over Western Front. The same with destroyers (SKG 210). Many sorties were done on this main attack direction.

There were small destroyers unit over South-Western Front Ju 88 A-5 III/KG 51 (but is sustained first day huge losses - 15 Ju 88 total lost >60% damage) next day it could done many sorties due to losses.
The amount of ground attack sorties were not so high over north (ZG 26) and south-west (III/KG 51) and south (none such specialised unit).

Standard sorties done by Me 109s and bombers were not so high, some pilots done 3-4 but other could stay and did not fly too.

I think, that there were much less sorties over north and south-west directin due to above reasons.
For many years we have had mistifiacation about presenting terrible and huge power of LW and very weak force of VVS RKKA. The true looks different and Soviet losses done by LW on 22.06.41 were not so high as many still strong belive.

Regards,
mirekw

[oquaig]

I consider it all part of the cold war culture to make people in the west believe the Germans (and therefore Western civilization) seem superior and the Americans allowed it to continue for cold war reasons. But the impression it leaves is that Luftwaffe assets flew 3 to 9 missions a day. In fact the average sortie rate over the summer was about 3 sorties per every 4 aircraft a day. Some flew many times a day while others did not sortie at all. For the West Front the average (10 July-31 July)seems to be abour 248 sorties a day and from my incomplete figures it looks like the average VVS West Front strength was about 338 aircraft, or about 3 sorties for every 4 aircraft. About the same.

Regards
Oquaig

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

Yes it was, and it was supported by Soviet era hundreds books, which hidden very deep real combat losses and amount soties of Soviet side ect. (were less tragict and less efficient, then many Western historians or real propagandists thought and written).

Second, in the past most of these books had great propaganda effect, and much less real facts and true figures. It was dual process, were both side had strong loved to live in many myths and lies, but not in the true!

Since 10 or so years there have surfaced several new books, many datas, documents, which try to find true in the past, which is not so fatntstic for LW's side, but also not so ideal/glorious for Soviet side too. True is not so easy, simple and nice, no mater of side, :-)

But now, knows many real figures from both sides one can see many interesting information. The true, stiill not easy and acceptable by many LW's or VVS RKKA funs, ideologists, slowly is surfacing. Real figures very good show it for both side.

Regards,
mirekw

[Andreas Brekken]

Originally Posted by Mirek Wawrzynski

About reports done by Soviet during the first weeks and month of war there are very difficoult find what exactly is a true there? In this part of air war commander Ptuchin was very soon arrested plus his chief of stuff by NKWD (both from political not any military reasons and again both were killed by NKVD on 23.02.42). New one had come on begining of July 1941 and he has done his report about losses on this front, if right remebr in August 1941?
This is similar case as Soviet reports from Wester Front (this was done on December 1941).
Anyway losses on the first day on South-Western Front were about 300 planes including 100 training, in was not so higfh, because there were over 2300 combat planes there.

Now better to see M. Solonin 2 books" "Nowja chronologia katastrofy vol. 1, vol. 2" 2010-2011, which is based on archiwal reports from regimenal and divisional level, he very good expalin this differences. On his www.side there were published some parts of both.

Regards,
mirekw

Hello, Mirek

Very interesting information.

What I conclude form this is that the Soviet aircraft losses are more or less unrecorded for the entire time from Barbarossa until a summary was made sometime in December 1941?

Lately there has been a lot of comments on this board dismissing the Luftwaffe records as inaccurate etc, and several airmens personal integrity questioned based on the claimed aircraft not being present in the Soviet loss records.

I have tried for years to get someone (anyone) to come up with copies of the original allegedly fantastically detailed Soviet loss records, but it seems that no-one is able to get this? Is it because the facilities for copying/scanning/photographing the records at for example TsAMO is so bad? Or is it because the records are still not open to the public? Or is there another explanation?

I am sure that a lot of students of the aerial warfare during WW2 would be very interested in being able to research these records, and I know that some go to the TsAMO regularly.

Would it be possible for the members of this board that have been researching these records to give us at least an example of transcripts of the records available?

What about coverage? It now seems if I read your message correct that we can forget any level of information for Barbarossa up until Dec 1941. But what about the rest of the war? How and when did the Soviets record their losses?

I know that it is a lot of questions to answer, but as I am writing up my article on the loss reporting and resupply organisation of the Luftwaffe this summer it would be interesting to also have information from the adversaries on all fronts.

Regards,
Andreas B

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

This is not so. The biggest mess associated loss of Soviet aviation applies to the first days and weeks of the war. Especially the most trouble is on the Western front, then the North West and the South-West Fronts. In these directions, the whole army went into German captivity, and their staffs have undergone even completely destroyed.

For example, there are few documents relating to actions 9 Air Division (41, 129, 124, 126th IAP, 13 SBAP) of the Western Front in the early days of the war (22.06.41-15.07.41). Then the reconstituted regiments losses based on relationships and infomation regimental commanders, chiefs of staff, but not all it could do (?). In this case, for example, lack infomacje 41st IAP action in the period 22/06/41 - 15/07/41, they practically do not exist. These residual information.
The regiment has just been almost completely destroyed by bombing Me 110 from SKG 210 in the evening 23.061941. With him standing there, two other regiments 9th SAD: 129 and 126 IAP. These three regiments lost in the quarters most of the planes in the evening 23/06/41. Their staff did practically nothing at all 23.061941, or 24-48 hours after the outbreak of war, far from the front.

Other regiments such 123rd IAP from 10th SAD and the 127th and 122 IAP of 11 SAD practically fought for the first two or three days, suffered heavy losses, but were not completely destroyed. For example, the 127th IAP fought 22.061941 throughout the day from the airport, which the evening was not detected by the Germans (Lesiszcze). Together with him the same airport operated 122nd IAP, which flew from the airport around noon in Nowy Dwór back to Lesiszcz. Squadrons of both regiments were dispersed only after flights in the back, including Lida evening June 22 and the next day.
Some pilots have abandoned the equipment in Lida, and some were destroyed June 23 after the attacks on Lida by Germans and other airports. Those planes that survived passed 26 June to 43rd IAD, near Minsk.

General report on the Western Front aviation losses arose only on 1 December 1941. He wrote it colonel Chudjakow who was not There, in June 1941 in staff aviation headquarters of the Western Front, he was ill in Moscow, where he healed and got to the front a few days later.

By the way, the gen. Kopiec was arrested by the NKVD about noon 6.22.1941 and died / committed suicide (?) on 23 July 1941 - one month later than for many years to write, or 22 June 1941. His successor, also was arrested by the NKVD (General Tajurski) and then was lost too. The reason for the arrest of both commanders were charged with conspiracy in the army, not a defeat and the defeat of aviation at the border.
For cowardice and abandoned the field of battle, was executed in Moscow, the commander of 9th Air Division gen Czernych on 16 October 1941, he was arrested by the NKVD in July 1941.

Chudjakow used to write the report, written reports, done a few days, weeks after 6/22/1941. Staff officers of the regiment, who wrote these documents had no interest to inform superiors about the mass leaving the equipment at the airports field near the border. Often the equipment has been slightly damaged, or even a fit. Instead they written about crushing German attacks in the first hours and days of the war. The fact that the equipment was left en masse watch you can see a few thousand photographs which have appeared, and which made the Germans occupied the airports in the summer of 1941. This is very much on the web.

In contrast, the loss of Soviet aviation later period are more accurate (remember what it was a unit: IAP or BAP, SZAP and where fighting etc.) Have been so carelessly conducted

The documents in Russian archives are available to researchers who will go there and know the Russian language. They can be there in place to develop. In recent years created a number of works in Russian based on these materials. Also depends on what someone writes of the war and about which unit? There is not, however, all data on all the units such as 41st IAP of 9.SAD of June-July 1941.


Regards,
mirekw

[Andreas Brekken]

Hello, Mirek

Thank you for the detailed explanation.

I understand from your post that if one is to be able to match information from both sides one have to very carefully research the movements and organizational changes in order to research information on the individual units in the area.

Regards,
Andreas B

[Nikita Egorov]

Hi, Andreas,

As I have already told before, you have one major document that includes all the needed infomation. That is GQ loss records. Other documents are to be compared with it in terms of proofreading, mistakes correcting etc...
We do not have such document and we have to research through thousands of operational, personal loss recording, technical and other documents to obtain one general list with the information gathered from different sources.
You saw several loss inspection records that were sent to you by one of the members of our board. Those inspection notes were done in every case of aircraft lost or damaged, no matter due to what reasons it happened. The problem is that few of them survived and were handled to archive, as well as many operational documents were lost to different reasons.

[Mirek Wawrzynski]

I understand from your post that if one is to be able to match information from both sides one have to very carefully research the movements and organizational changes in order to research information on the individual units in the area.

Yes, very carefull. There were 4 levels of making such documents: basic - regimental for example in 123. IAP, second - divisional - in 10. SAD, third - army level - 4. Army (air command), and the last one - Western Front - air command. On each stage could be done some errors, cuts, misinterpretation, type errors ect.

Yes it is, but it is no so stright, simple and nice, :-)
Due to the total lost of communication among all levels in the first days of Barbarossa it was a huge total mass on Western Front in each air command level's posts. None one exacly had know where were higher or lower command post (and units) and did not gathered any real (true value) information or orders. Many documents from the first level were lost or destoryed and were later "rewritten" according orders to have such general information including all losses, but it was not done according daily regimental diary (hour by hour) of combats reports from regimelntal level, which were mostly lost, a few exist (like for 127. IAP but not for whole 9. SAD and its 5 regiments).

Regards,
mirekw

[oquaig]

"Now better to see M. Solonin 2 books" "Nowja chronologia katastrofy vol. 1, vol. 2" 2010-2011, which is based on archiwal reports from regimenal and divisional level, he very good expalin this differences. On his www.side there were published some parts of both."

Hello Mirek,
I have been reading Mr. Solonin’s book with great interest. I have always known there was a bottle neck in High Octane Aviation production, but I had no real figures until now. But it also explains a lot of what followed during the invasion.
After the 1940 Campaign in France the Germans claimed they destroyed most of the French air force on the ground in the first days of the war. It turns out that was a lie.
http://www.airforce.ru/

Seach under Istoria near bottom of page:
Problems of the Luftwaffe before the war with the USSR (for example, air blitzkrieg in France)
Article A.Stepanova.

Even in the Moscow Conference in 1940 the assembled VVS commanders thought that strikes on air fields were not that effective.

Regards
Oquaig

[Andreas Brekken]

Hi, Mirek and Nikita

Thank you both for contributing to this thread. The information brought forward is both highly interesting and clarifying.

Apart from the understandable chaos and confusion following the initial attack during Barbarossa, what is your impression on the available records on the organization and strength records of the VVS? What do they contain, and where were these recorded and updated at the time?

It would be very interesting to hear how you guys would start off when researching for example a series of events on a given front area.

It is clear to me that although the specific records on the VVS side might contain more extensive information, the organizational complexity with regards to how these records were kept poses a very real challenge to the researcher.

Again, thank you very much for the useful insights, I for one will certainly follow your work in the future.

Regards,
Andreas B