Eastern vs Western Front (was: La-7 vs ???)

[Christer Bergström]

”we can always theorizice but in that we must be careful. And You are not. Your figures for Med are a moot point. You forget one major player (RA) and by doing so You almost double the superiority of Allies”

In mid-1943, the majority of the Italians were not particularly interested in dying for Il Duce. If you read Prien, “JG 77”, p. 1621, you will find a long text about how it seems plausible that elements in the Italian Air Force cooperated with the Allies and in July 1943 gave them information on the whereabout of German aircraft on airfields in Sicily.

Moreover, even the parts of the Italian Air Force which were interested in fighting for Il Duce, were badly hampered by a lack of fuel, spare parts, aircraft - you name it. (See what Steinhoff writes in his book on Sicily.) Which in turn was an effect, among other things, of the lacking motivation to fight for Mussolini.

I don’t ask you to compare the number of Allied aircraft shot down by Italian airmen with the number of Allied aircraft shot down by German airmen in the Mediterranean; such figures are very hard to obtain. (However, some hints are found in Shores's two books on the air war in North Africa.) But here’s something easier: If you study the history of the Italian AF in action against the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean between 1940 and 1943 and compare that with the accomplishment of much smaller Luftwaffe detachments against the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean between 1940 and 1943, I think it is obvious that you can’t just compare the numbers when the Italian armed forces are involved.

”Usually after a crushing defeat the victors had superiority at that theatre of war. From the situation after the battle is rather difficult to draw right conclusions on the reasons of the victory/defeat.”

The Western Allies were able to sustain much higher losses than the Luftwaffe, because they (the Allies) had many, many more aircraft, and each day large numbers of new aircraft and new aircrew arrived to increase the size of the combined Allied air force, while the Luftwaffe barely was able to replace its losses. If the huge Allied numerical superiority in the air in the Med was not the dominant reason to their victory in the air, then you have to come up with some really convincing arguments regarding other factors which should have been even more important.

Please consider these figures for Tunisia, April 1943:

I./JG 53 lost 47 Bf 109s (including 15 to enemy action) and received only 21 Bf 109s as replacement, and had only 13 Bf 109s on 1 May 1943. (During the same period, it achieved 32 victories.)

II./JG 53 lost 51 Bf 109s (including 18 to enemy action, 14 of which were destroyed in bombing attacks against II./JG 53’s air base) and received only 38 Bf 109s as replacements. (During the same period, it achieved 24 victories.)

II./JG 77 lost 28 Bf 109s (including 9 to enemy action) and received 26 Bf 109s as replacements. (During the same period, it achieved 34 victories.)

In total, the combined strength of these three Jagdgruppen went down from 103 Bf 109s on 1 April 1943 to 66 on 1 May 1943, a drop of 35 % in just one month.

(Talking about the Italian Air Force, Italy produced only 2,818 aircraft through 1942.)

The Allied ability to not only replace their losses, but even increase their number of aircraft, was the single most important factor to the fact that the Allies finally managed to achieve air supremacy in Tunisia. If the crushing Allied numerical superiority was not a key factor - then what? You can’t say that the Allies had better trained pilots than the Germans in Tunisia, and you can’t say that they had better tactics or generally better aircraft. If numerical superiority did not decide the outcome - then what? :?:

“Or what You think on the following example. On 30.6.40 British had in Europe let say 100 combat ready tanks, Germans had let say 2.500. (the number were imaginary but not far from the reality) From this one draws the conclusion that it was the 25:1 superiority in tanks which decided the 1940 Campaign in West and this historian proofs his claim on the assertion that if the British had had 2500 tanks and the Germans only 100 tanks in 10.5.40 the results would have been different. To me this sort of argument isn't creative thinking but zero-research, if not worse.”

In fact, one of the key factors to the German victory in the West in 1940 was German numerical superiority in tanks and aircraft on the battlefield. Out of the Luftwaffe’s plus 5,000 aircraft, almost 4,000 were directly involved to support the Western offensive in May 1940. On 10 May 1940, Armée de l’Air had 1,400 aircraft deployed in France’s western and northern parts, and the RAF had 416 aircraft stationed in France. On 10 May 194o, the Allies possessed a total of 2,689 tanks against the German total of 2,439 tanks. However, on the battlefield, the Germans enjoyed a crushing numerical superiority. For instance, most of the 530 French FT17, FT18 tanks were deployed behind the Maginot line in May 1940. Meanwhile, the Germans created power concentrations where they concentrated the bulk of their armoured forces - thus reaching a crushing numerical superiority in tanks.

But your example is ill-sought, at least if you are looking for a parallel to the reason to the Allied dominance in the air in Tunisia in 1943. All historians agree that the Germans were able to achieve such a decisive numerical superiority on the battlefield in the West in 1940 due to a superior German tactic.

Alas: I have seen no one who claims that the Allies had such a superior tactic in Tunisia in 1942/1943. To the contrary, it seems to be that if any side had a better tactic and better trained pilots in Tunisia in 1942/1943, it was rather the Germans. :!:

So we are back where we started: It seems quite plausible that the Allied dominance in the air in Tunisia in 1943 - which was finally achieved against an enemy which enjoyed a qualitative superiority - would have been completely unthinkable without the Western Allied crushing numerical superiority which ultimately overwhelmed German qualitative advantages.

”6.6.44 situation in the West is better example, because it is the time of the beginning of one campaign, but it was also a result of a long and bitter campaign for the air supremacy over Western France, which the Allies had won by greater industrial capacity,”

Yes, there were two major industrial powers, with unlimited access to raw material and work forces, against less than half the industry in a Germany which was poor on key minerals. Of course the combined industries of the USA and the UK were larger than less than half of Germany’s industry. (More than half of Germany’s war production was sent to the Eastern Front.) That was a key factor to the huge numerical superiority which the Western Allies built up.

“by much better production planning, by focusing right things”

Maybe. In any case, the USA and the UK sent something like ten times more aircraft into action than the Germans were able to employ.

“by better high command”

Please elaborate on that. In which way did the Western Allies have more competent air force commanders than the Luftwaffe? It’s easy to feel strong when you outnumber your enemy by ten to one. However, the American AF commanders entered the war without having learned much about the need for a fighter escort doctrine, and the British AF commanders wasted thousands of aircraft sorties and airmen on virtually useless operations over France in daylight in 1941 and against German population centres. The Western Allies could sure have made use of a more competent air force high command!

“by perseverance”

Aircraft production figures:

1943:
UK: 26,263
USA: 85,898

1944:
UK: 26,461
USA: 96,318

When the Western Allies produced almost a quarter of a million aircraft in those two years - while Germany produced “only” 25,527 aircraft in 1943 and 39,807 in 1944 - I don’t think there was a great demand for particular skills in perseverance abilities. . . What do you think?

(Okay, Japan: 8,861 aircraft produced in 1942 and 16,693 in 1943. . . The meagre Italian figures were showed above.)

Remember also that a large part (around 50 % in mid-1943) of the Luftwaffe served on the Eastern Front.

“and by aggressiveness”

Are you seriously implying that the RAF and USAAF pilots showed a greater aggressiveness than the Luftwaffe pilots in 1943, 1944, 1945? If not - what is the point of bringing this up when we are discussing which other factors than sheer numbers that might have decided the air war in the West and Med to the advantage of the Western Allies? (If you really think that the RAF and USAAF pilots showed a greater aggressiveness than the Luftwaffe pilots in 1943, 1944, 1945, then please show us the sources to your theory.)

“And of course by the effects of Eastern front.”

I agree completely. Without the efforts of the Red Army, not even the vast numbers of the RAF and the USAAF would have sufficed to bring down the Luftwaffe in 1944. In the end, they probably would have brought down the Luftwaffe - but it would have taken much longer. (And of course conversely, without the "second front" which the Western Allies opened in June 1944, the Red Army would not have sufficed to bring down the Wehrmacht in 1945. In the end, the Soviets probably would have brought down the Wehrmacht - but it would have taken much longer.)

“But as I have wrote earlier, the LW losses against Western Allies had been greater than those against SU since late 1942.”

Just one small correction. The Luftwaffe losses in the West plus the Med temporarily surpassed the losses in the East in October - November 1942, as a combined result of the thaw period in the East which brought down air action to a minimum while at the same time the German air offensive against Malta in October 1942 and the Allied major offensive in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco in November resulted in a peak in air fighting in the Mediterranean area. The tendency of the West plus the Med and being responsible for the bulk of the Luftwaffe losses started in February 1943, when the Allies achieved a manifold and steadily increasing numerical superiority in Tunisia.

Prior to that, the bulk of the Luftwaffe’s losses were sustained on the Eastern Front. The reason is simple - although the British enjoyed a significant numerical superiority against the Luftwaffe in both the Wets and the Mediterranean from mid-1941 and throughout 1942, it was not until the Americans arrived to add their huge numbers to those of the British that the Western Allies achieved such a numerical superiority that they could start wearing down the Luftwaffe. So you see, it really had very little to do with pilot quality, aircraft quality, tactics or organisation. The superiority in pilot quality which the Allies later achieved was an effect of the numerical superiority which eventually wore down even the Luftwaffe’s quality.

“The importance of the many mistakes made by the OKL (which clearly is a part of LW and must be taken in account when we estimete the quality of the LW as an air force) and OKW must not be forgotten. For example the LW had wasted much of its bomber force in West in early 44 in those largely useless attacks against UK.”

I don't deny that the OKL and the OKW committed many serious mistakes. But before we start discussing “many mistakes”, we must take the general picture into consideration. The OKL and the OKW also accomplished much which testifies to great military competence. Mistakes were made by both sides. The decisive effect of mistakes committed by one side can be measured only if we compare them with the effect of mistakes committed by the other side. Otherwise, we fall in the trap of making too strong simplifications and nurturing myths.

There is a trend in popular history to selectively focus on mistakes committed by “Hitler and Göring”, while mistakes of similar amplitude committed by the Allies are neglected. One such huge mistake made by the Allied was that the Americans entered the war with a totally wrong air doctrine, assuming that there was no need for fighter escort. There simply was no real US air doctrine for fighter escort, which had a negative impact on fighter designation. This led to total failure for the first phase of the bomber offensive, and tremendous losses for the bombers. As Williamson Murray writes: “They allowed preconceived judgements to filter out reality until ‘Black Thursday’ over Schweinfurt faced them with defeat”. (“Luftwaffe”, p. 443.)

Also, both the RAF and the USAAF wasted much of their bomber forces to bomb objects which dealt Germany no decisive harm, while Germany’s real Achilles heel (synthetic oil plants) was saved from methodical Allied bombings until May 1944.

”I don't deny the effects of numerical superiority in air war, but when the waring parties are big industrial powers it would be not easy to get and maintain a great numerical superiority if one's AF is greatly worse in tactical skills than the opponent.”

Why? In 1943 - 1944, the USA and the UK produced almost a quarter of a million combat aircraft. With such a huge industrial power, it was evident from the onset that the crushing numerical superiority would ultimately wear down also the Luftwaffe’s superior quality. And that also is exactly what happened. There is no other factor which might explain why the Western Allies were able to turn the difficult situation in the air war in the period 1940 to mid-1942 into one of a crushing victory in late 1944.

All best,

Christer Bergström