Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)

[edwest2]

Originally Posted by Broncazonk

Well, I'm not so sure, because for the third or fourth time: What could have been done if Bodenplatte was such a bad idea? What alternatives did the Luftwaffe have on that day?

I'm all ears.

Because in the the absence of any historical *analysis* to the contrary, that is, after 85-years, (and after all the Bodenplatte beans have been relentlessly counted,) if not a single Luftwaffe expert historian can propose a better idea, or indeed, a list of alternative ideas, then maybe Operation Bodenplatte wasn't such a bad idea after all. Bodenplatte has been universally denigrated--an operation forced on the Luftwaffe by the Führer--but maybe the 'bad idea' is absolute nonsense.

Are we coming to the realization that the study of history might require a mental process commonly known as, ANALYSIS, and counting up the beans of Luftwaffe history is merely the first, and very, preliminary step in what a Luftwaffe historian should be doing?

Bodenplatte has been grossly mischaracterized for the last 85-years. Prove me wrong.

Bronc

You fail by asking the wrong questions. What could have been done differently? Based on what? What are the starting points if not hard data? A useless exercise in that what actually happened was, in fact, the final decision. You follow that by the gross presumption that you think you have the same information that the planners, at the time, had.

A Luftwaffe historian, or any historian, can only draw on the same data until more is uncovered. That's it. You are done. You have nothing to add.

You cannot know their private discussions or their strengths and weaknesses when it came to planning. Even the best men on any side of a conflict can make a mistake or take a risk that brought back a lesser than desired outcome. YOU want to turn this into a chess match where you move the pieces around the board as you please. That approach will never be history.

You are trying to impose your own thoughts onto what actually happened. What you call "analysis" is nothing more than taking various elements as perfect components that never fail and plugging them into any scenario you care to invent.

[Broncazonk]

The answers I seek are mostly contained in, Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope, by John Manrho and Ron Pütz--but you have to read between the lines to get them. Upon re-reading the book, it is readily apparent why this book is widely regarded as the best and most detailed archival study of the operation.

In summary:

1) In September 1944, the Fuhrer decided on the Ardennes offensive and directed the Luftwaffe to provide air support for it.

2) Göring immediately issued orders to plan/prepare a large-scale air operation directly related to the Ardennes armor offensive.

3) On 16 September 1944, Generalleutnant Werner Kreipe, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, was directed to refine Luftwaffe air support planning and preparations for the German armor penetration.

4) On 14 November 1944, Göring ordered Luftflotte 3 (West) to prepare for a major ground-attack air operation in support of the German armor in the Ardennes offensive. Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz was assigned to actually plan the operation and his staff were well underway in December 1944.

5) On 5 December 1944, a planning conference of Luftwaffe commanders was held at Flammersfeld. Geschwader and Gruppe commanders were ordered to attend the meeting and Peltz, (newly appointed commander of II. Jagdkorps) directed the meeting and the planning effort.

6) Planning was worked out with the Jagdgeschwader commanders on 15 December, 1944.

7) The specific idea of a massive low-level surprise attack on Allied airfields—the thing we know as Bodenplatte—was developed by Luftwaffe staff and planners for months, specifically Peltz and his staff, rather than by the Fuhrer personally.

8) Several postwar accounts describe Galland's earlier idea of a Großer Schlag ("Great Blow") against Allied air power being offered to Peltz. Peltz considered Galland's plan and rejected it. It was Peltz, not the Fuhrer who transformed Galland's concept into a low-level airfield attack rather than (Galland's preferred) mass interception battle. Peltz was fundamentally a ground-attack specialist, not a fighter commander. Rather than attacking Allied aircraft in the air, he favored destroying them on the ground. The result was the low-level airfield strike concept that became Bodenplatte. And from the very beginning, the operation was conceived as direct support for the Ardennes armor offensive.

(Manrho & Pütz have primary-source level evidence for all of this. Those include surviving Luftwaffe war diaries (Kriegstagebücher), II. Jagdkorps operational files, and postwar interrogations of officers such as Peltz, Grabmann, and other Jagddivision commanders.)

Generalmajor (and commander of the 3rd Jagddivision) Walter Grabmann's role appears to have been significant, but subordinate to Peltz's overall direction.

The surviving record suggests three levels of planning:

Peltz (II. Jagdkorps) — overall operational commander and chief planner.
Grabmann (3. Jagddivision) and Hentschel (5. Jagddivision) — translated the concept into executable missions for the fighter wings under their control.
Geschwaderkommodores (such as Bär, Ihlefeld, Kogler, etc.) — worked out the final route, timing, target, and formation details for their individual units.

The most important surviving reference is the planning conference on 15 December 1944. Peltz worked out the plan with the Jagdgeschwader commanders, including Walter Grabmann and Karl Hentschel, commanders of the 3rd and 5th Fighter Divisions.

At the time of Bodenplatte, Grabmann commanded the 3rd Jagddivision, one of the principal fighter formations assigned to the operation. Under him were several of the units that would conduct the attacks, including JG 1, JG 3, JG 6, and JG 26.

So Grabmann's probable responsibilities included:

Assessing which fighter units could participate.
Determining aircraft availability.
Reviewing navigation routes.
Allocating targets among subordinate wings.
Coordinating timing and assembly points.
Reviewing fuel and operational constraints.
Relaying the finalized plan to operational commanders.

For the last 85-years, Walter Grabmann and Karl Hentschel have escaped any and all blame for errors in the Bodenplatte operational planning. The question that still remains is whether the disastrous navigation arrangements and secrecy requirements originated with Peltz's headquarters or whether Grabmann/Hentschel had a larger role in those decisions.

The documentation is thin. What we can be said with confidence is that Grabmann/Hentschel were inside the core planning group at the mid-December conferences, not merely field commanders receiving a finished plan--and nobody ever talks about those men.

Bodenplatte has accumulated a remarkable number of myths because it was dramatic and disastrous, but the reality is far more nuanced than the popular narrative.

1. "Bodenplatte was Hitler's idea."

No.

The evidence points to:

Hitler ordered the Ardennes offensive and demanded Luftwaffe support. Göring complied and Luftwaffe headquarters staff developed the requirement over months. Peltz and II. Jagdkorps and Grabmann/Hentschel designed the operation.

There is no known surviving document showing Hitler personally conceiving the airfield-strike concept.

2) Bodenplatte is nearly always treated as a standalone event:

"On 1 January 1945 the Luftwaffe launched a massive surprise attack on Allied airfields." That description is true, but it strips the operation from the context in which the Germans conceived it.

Bodenplatte was never intended to be a standalone operation.

It was one component of a much larger strategic package:

The Ardennes offensive (Wacht am Rhein).
Operation Greif (Skorzeny's infiltration force).
Operation Stösser (the German airborne drop).
Bodenplatte.
The planned follow-on offensive toward Antwerp.

The Germans viewed these as interconnected pieces of a single effort to fracture the Allied coalition and regain the initiative in the West.

From Peltz's perspective, the question was not:

"Can I permanently/strategically destroy Allied air power?"

It was:

"Can I tactically suppress Allied tactical air power long enough for the Ardennes offensive to succeed?"

Those are very different objectives. Bodenplatte is frequently discussed as: Ardennes offensive and Bodenplatte, almost as if they were separate stories.

But for German planners they were the same story.

If the Ardennes offensive had somehow broken through to Antwerp, historians today would almost certainly describe Bodenplatte very differently. It would likely be remembered as: "The Luftwaffe's crucial supporting attack during the Ardennes campaign."

3. "Bodenplatte was a complete failure."

No. Tactically, it was initially VERY successful.

The Germans achieved surprise at many airfields and destroyed or damaged hundreds of Allied aircraft.

Strategically, however, it failed because:

Allied aircraft losses were quickly replaced. German pilot losses were not.

Thus: Tactical success. Strategic failure. Those are not the same thing.

4. "The Germans lost mostly airplanes."

Yes. But, the real catastrophe was pilots. Germany could still build fighters in late 1944. What it could not easily replace were:

Staffelkapitäne
Gruppenkommandeure
'Old Hare' flight leaders
navigators

Many of these men were lost on January 1, 1945.

The Luftwaffe lost a major part of its leadership cadre in a single morning. This is why many Luftwaffe veterans (Werner Girbig, in Six Months to Oblivion) viewed Bodenplatte as a disaster even though hundreds of Allied aircraft burned.

5. "German flak shot down most of the German losses."
No. This is one of the most persistent myths.

Friendly flak certainly shot down some German aircraft as the secrecy of the operation meant many flak units were not informed. However, the research indicates that Allied fighters and operational causes accounted for most German losses, not German flak.

6. "The plan was crazy."

NO.

From a January 1945 perspective it was not irrational.

German leaders knew: the Ardennes offensive was underway, Allied air power was overwhelming, Germany had only one major concentration of fighters left.

A surprise attack against airfields was a military option with a rational basis.

The problem was not that it was insane. The problem was that Germany no longer possessed the resources to exploit even a successful result.

7. "The Allies barely noticed."

NO.

The Allied command was stunned and embarrassed and a 85-year cover-up ensued.

Most of the Allied airfields actually suffered severe losses.

8. "Galland opposed concentration/mass attacks."

Nope. Almost the opposite. Galland did A LOT of lying after the war. A whole lot.

Galland favored concentration. Galland's preferred concept was a massive fighter concentration against bomber formations in the air. Peltz's concept concentrated the fighters against airfields on the ground. Both men believed in a decisive concentration of force.

9. "The operation failed because of poor flying."

Nope.

Navigation was a major issue, but not the whole story.

The operation suffered from: poor weather, radio silence, inexperienced pilots, secrecy restrictions, route complexity, friendly flak, Allied resistance, lack of replacement personnel. No single factor explains the outcome.

10) The biggest misconception of all? Many popular accounts describe Bodenplatte as: "Hitler ordered a suicidal attack that accomplished nothing."

The factual truth: it was a Luftwaffe operation specifically designed to support the Ardennes offensive that achieved substantial tactical surprise and inflicted real damage, but whose strategic logic depended on a German recovery that was already impossible by January 1945.

Operation Bodenplatte was not a bizarre last gasp. It was a technically competent operation--laced with the poison with a couple of deadly planning flaws--launched by a force whose broader strategic situation had become absolutely hopeless.

Bronc

[Broncazonk]

An unresolved question (for me) is the timing of Operation Bodenplatte in relation to the Ardennes Offensive.

A Timeline of the Ardennes Offensive

16–18 December 1944: Extreme Optimism

The Ardennes offensive began on the morning of 16 December, 1944.

German commanders were encouraged because: total surprise had been achieved, American lines were penetrated, many prisoners were being taken.

At this stage most senior German commanders believed the operation had a chance.

19–20 December: Only three days later: the first serious doubts emerge

By 19 December, several realities were becoming apparent: road congestion was severe, fuel consumption was exceeding expectations, key bridges had not been seized on schedule, and the advance was slowing.

Officers at the front began expressing concern. However, "trouble" is not the same as "failure." Many still thought success was possible.

21–23 December: The weather breaks

This was probably the most important turning point. The German plan depended heavily on bad weather limiting Allied air power.

Beginning around 23 December: the weather improved, Allied tactical aircraft returned in force, Allied fighter-bombers began attacking roads, bridges, and supply columns.

German commanders immediately recognized this as a major problem.

So what happened to Operation Bodenplatte? Where did that go?

The plan from the very beginning was to support the Ardennes offensive during the initial, critical stage. It was supposed to be connected to the German offensive schedule and was expected to occur much closer to the opening phase of the Ardennes campaign. It was NEVER envisioned as a symbolic New Year's Day attack.

The operation was tentatively scheduled several times and postponed repeatedly due to...weather conditions? Yet, the Allies began flying thousands of missions on 23 December.

24–25 December: Operational crisis

By Christmas: fuel shortages were becoming critical, the Meuse River remained distant, Antwerp was effectively unattainable, American resistance was stiffening.

At this point German corps commanders believed the original objective was no longer achievable.

Still no Bodenplatte.

26 December: Bastogne relieved

The offensive was in serious trouble on this day.

On 26 December: elements of the U.S. 4th Armored Division reached Bastogne, the encirclement was broken, German hopes of eliminating the Bastogne salient evaporated.

The Germans understood the significance immediately. Bastogne sat astride critical road networks needed for further advance.

And still no Bodenplatte.

28 December: Rundstedt and Model concede

On 28 December 1944: Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and Field Marshal Walter Model met with Hitler. Both argued that the offensive should be curtailed and that the original objectives could no longer be reached. The commanders responsible for executing the operation were essentially admitting that the operational concept had failed.

The Fuhrer refused to accept this conclusion.

1 January 1945: Bodenplatte finally occurs

When Bodenplatte flew: the Ardennes Offensive had long since failed.

The Allies were in the air on the 23rd. The Germans didn't fly until 10-days later.

What the Hell?

Bronc

[edwest2]

So, what else was going on at Antwerp? I'll leave it to you to find the dates. V-2 rocket and V-1 bombardment had reduced port capacity to 25%. The port was clogged with sunken and damaged ships. Off-loading supplies became difficult. One V-2 strike had set off a fuel supply on the docks that could not be extinguished.


A few members of Skorzeny's special force that had been captured told their interrogators that their secondary target was General Eisenhower. Once word reached his HQ, a double was ordered to take regular walks outside. This to lure any men who had made it through into a trap.

[Nick Beale]

Bodenplatte did coincide with the Nordwind offensive toward Strasbourg.

As for Peltz …

TNA AIR 25/731: No. 85 Group Intell. Summary No. 39, Period Sunrise 14.1.45 to Sunrise 21.1.45

The costly airfield attack of 1 January was unmistakably pure PELZ.

… so far PELZ has never learned from his mistakes. He seems brave personally, having been a Stuka pilot before the days of Allied air superiority. Since going off ops, the prospect of other men—his crews—facing murderous odds certainly has not caused him to quail.

… He is the ideal leader if rapid wastage of an air force is desired.

TNA WO 205/286: 9 U.S. Army (Part I) Operation “GRENADE”

G-2 estimate of enemy situation, HQ XIII Corps, 3 February 1945
4. Air …Pelz was given command of an anti-shipping force in North Africa in 1942 on which occasion he took such heavy losses his unit had to be disbanded. In succeeding commands he persisted in competing when overmatched, therefore we may expect he will continue his gamble against superior forces and made [sic] attacks on a scale similar to the airfield attacks of 1 January.

[Franek Grabowski]

I am reading this thread confused but with some amusement.
The idea of attacking aircraft on the ground was neither new nor stupid. The problem was in execution, but then the execution was poor. Allied losses, even if substantial, where replaceable. The German losses were irreplaceable, and way too heavy. So, that is now quite obvious. But then, reasons of the failure are less than obvious. There are several points worth of consideration, that should be answered before blaming the staff.
Alternately, there was a plan of Galland, that has been cancelled. We shall never know if it had been chosen. We may assume, however, that it would inevitably end up in a massacre of German fighters. Why? Because we have the record of combats through 1944. Galland could claim whatever he liked post-war, but it was under his command, Jagdwaffe suffered critical failures in 1943 & 1944.
Now, a pun aimed at some big heads. Ridiculing people trying to find answers to quite obvious questions, and calling them to make own research is a hypocrisy. Above all, not everyone has to do a research by oneself. Then, there are some people who do not bother to make even essential reading, well, plenty of them. But if a one comes with such questions following reading of a number of books, then it is the problem with the books, and not with the people. It is my observation, that most of the books are about number of kills, RLM numbers, etc. but there is almost nothing on personal relationship, relationship between ranks, responsibilities, training, planning and all other issues pertaining operations from a soldier to the general staff. Now we have to rely on decimated records, but several high ranking officers were still alive in 1980s, or even 1990s. They could have been interviewed but it seems nobody bothered to ask them such questions.

[Stig Jarlevik]

Our friend Geoffrey Sinclair adds the following regarding Allied supply situation at Antwerp,
plus a little more

https://www.v2rocket.com/start/chapters/antwerp.html
Does not report clogging with sunk or damaged ships but does say "the planned discharge rate was less than 25 percent of Antwerp's actual discharge capacity." Antwerp had 242 berths, the allies did not have that many ships plus used other ports. Rouen was opened as a US Army port with 15 liberty and 26 coaster berths, mainly intended for bulk POL.

The US Army take on the supply situation and Antwerp.

US Army cargo landed by month by port, excluding vehicles and bulk POL in long tons, June 1944 to April 1945.
June, Antwerp 0 tons, US Army all ports/beaches total, 291,333 tons.
July, Antwerp 0 tons, US Army all ports/beaches total, 621,322 tons.
August, Antwerp 0 tons, US Army all ports/beaches total, 1,112,771 tons.
September, Antwerp 0 tons, US Army all ports/beaches total, 1,210,290 tons.
October, Antwerp 0 tons, US Army all ports/beaches total, 1,309,184 tons.
November, Antwerp 5,873 tons, US Army all ports/beaches total, 1,402,080 tons.
December, Antwerp 427,592 tons, US Army all ports total, 1,555,819 tons.
January, Antwerp 433,094 tons, US Army all ports total, 1,501,269 tons.
February, Antwerp 473,463 tons, US Army all ports total, 1,735,502 tons.
March, Antwerp 558,066 tons, US Army all ports total, 2,039,778 tons.
April, Antwerp 628,227 tons, US Army all ports total, 2,025,142 tons.

Omaha 1,264,999 tons, Utah 726,014 tons, Cherbourg 2,654,298 tons, Minor Normandy Ports including Granville 600,884 tons, Brittany ports 253,837 tons, Le Havre 1,128,554 tons, Rouen 1,126,500 tons, Antwerp 2,526,315 tons, Ghent 535,252 tons, South France 3,988,837 tons, Total 14,804,490 tons.

On 17th August to give an idea of the US Army shipping backlog a ship, presumably loaded with medical supplies, arrives in Europe on this day, it finally begins unloading on 10th December.

On 31st August Some 76 ocean going ships have discharged their cargoes in August, and there are 207 ships in Europe, though some of these are awaiting a convoy to return with. During August the US dispatches 178 cargo ships to Europe, up from 133 in April, even though the War Department is becoming alarmed at the apparent desire for the theater to have 100 to 150 ships as floating reserves. There are some 230 ships assigned to the theatre, including those en route. Until the end of August ships are selectively unloaded, leaving many in a partially loaded state as effectively floating magazines. Washington strongly objects to the build up of shipping and as a result some of the partially unloaded ships are returned to the US. For example the 35,000 tons of pierced steel planking and associated airfield construction materials in 21 ships that was sent to Europe, not unloaded, returned to the US and sent back to Europe on the next sailing.

On 4th September (D+90) first train beyond Paris. Allied armies are on the D+330 lines. In the US case this means supporting 33% more divisions than the plans expected to cross the Seine on D+120 in an area not expected to be captured until May 1945, over 450 mile supply lines using motor transport, when the amount of such transport was predicted to be inadequate for the original plan. Antwerp is captured, the port has berths for 242 ships, not all will be brought back into service. The front line halts in what are effectively the northern suburbs of Antwerp.

On 22nd September some of the merchant ships waiting off northern France are sent to Marseilles.

During September the English Channel is reopened for through traffic, ships can now make English east coast ports as quickly as the west coast ones, and enabling return voyages south of Ireland, shortening the voyage.

At the end of September there are now around 280 merchant ships assigned to the theatre, around 160 waiting their turn to unload. Amongst the items not shipped or landed through the lack of unloading capacity are replacement vehicles.

In early October, in view of the large backlog of unloaded ships in theatre, sailings from the US for the next three months would be programmed on the basis of demonstrated ability to unload the ships.

On 9th October the first ship docks at Le Havre. Eisenhower declares Antwerp to be of supreme importance. The US announces the cuts to shipping will stand until the capacity to unload ships in Europe is shown to be increasing and the number of ships in theatre significantly decreases.

On 20th October there are at least 240 ships in European waters. The US places additional restrictions on sending rations, vehicles and ammunition until the backlog of such ships already in Europe is reduced.

On 28th October General Franklin, Assistant Chief of Transportation for Water Activities arrives in Europe to "assist in clearing up the shipping situation".

On 31st October there are some 243 cargo ships in the theatre with only around 60 being discharged, while some of the others have unloaded and are awaiting a convoy out. There had been bad October storms. In addition there were 62 US ships discharging or awaiting discharge in southern France with another 25 vessels en route there from the US. Marseille is becoming congested from all the cargo landed but not cleared from the port, the repeat of the pattern in other ports, this is despite the rail links running north can now handle 12,000 tons/day. The supply bottleneck in the south for the remainder of the war is rail, lacking the capacity to clear the cargo from a fully working Marseille, so once Antwerp opens ships will be unloaded in the north where possible.

On 4th November the first allied minesweeper makes it to Antwerp.

On 13th November Utah beach is closed. On 19th November Mulberry B ceased operations and Omaha beach is closed, in order to keep the beaches operating so well for so long the 1st, 5th and 6th Engineer special regiments have had to be used to handle the cargo, instead of being assigned to other amphibious operations. The 1st Brigade is sent to the US on 18th December and will be used in the assault on Okinawa.

On 20th November Eastbound trains occupy every rail block from the Belgian border to Namur, within a few days the entire Belgian network is so congested trains have to unload at the French border. A similar situation has developed in the Verdun area and V weapon strikes on Liege disrupt rail movement there in the last 10 days of November. The armies are keeping too much of their supplies on wheels and the forward depots are not able or expected to be able to normally handle the bulk shipments they are receiving.

On 22nd November General MacArthur is informed the President had been notified of the world wide shipping shortage and a directive has been issued to the Joint Chiefs to take immediate action on the problem. MacArthur has around 476 ships, Europe has around 220. In Europe's case the number of ships awaiting discharge has begun to fall, down to around 130 from 190 at the start of the month, but this is mainly due to the decrease in the ships being sent. Even so the US orders 61 MTV ships to be returned to the US to help ease the shipping shortage

On 26th November Antwerp is opened when 3 coasters arrive. Some 219 out of 242 berths have been completely cleared, all 600 cranes are working and all necessary bridges repaired. There is an acute shortage of storage space at or near the port, although there is fuel storage for 120 million gallons.

On 28th November Antwerp is opened for US cargo as the first liberty ship arrives, but while the port can discharge 80 to 100,000 tons/day the land links can initially only clear 10 to 20,000 tons/day. All up a convoy of 19 liberty ships arrive. The AA defences of Antwerp and the Schelde estuary total 216 3.7 inch and 486 40 mm guns, plus another 120 3.7 inch, 192 90mm and around 150 40mm guns for anti V1 duties. There were also searchlight batteries, smoke companies, a balloon barrage over the estuary, mine watching service and a dummy port site. Due to the scale of the attack the allies minimise the unloading of ammunition at the port, using remote berths, not allowing any stocks. As the scale of the V1 and V2 attacks grow the decision is taken to only unload ammunition there for the AA guns defending it, other ports handle the army ammunition, except for special cases. To help clear the cargo the Albert canal is to be brought into operation, hopefully by mid December. Antwerp actually makes the US Army rail congestion problem worse since it shortens travel time, leaving the depots that much less time to unload trains.

On 30th November start of ABC (American British Canadian) or (Antwerp Brussels Charleroi) run from Antwerp, around 90 miles, it will shift 245,000 tons of cargo using only 4/5 ton truck tractors with 10 ton semi trailers before it ends on 26th March, using an average of 16 truck companies, 2 of which do nothing but shuttle between the port and the truck marshalling yard, there are 2 trailers for each prime mover, one in use, one being loaded or unloaded. Average truck load 8.7 tons and average round trip 20 hours.

At the end of November despite all the efforts there are still 2,500,000 missing jerricans. With the opening of Antwerp the fuel situation is finally completely under control. Antwerp is used to land fuel for 1st and 9th armies and ADSEC, using bulk rail cars to move the fuel, excess to the Liege dumps.

During early December the backlog of cargo will be cleared from Antwerp, relieving the initial congestion. As Antwerp comes on line it is realised the bottleneck has moved from ports and transport to the reception ability of the supply dumps, a lack of troops and storage. At times during December and January supplies are forwarded in bulk based on what depots had the capacity to receive them, not on what they needed.

On the 2nd of December the supply dump at Antwerp becomes operational. One of the contradictory factors about Antwerp is that by being so close to the front lines during the winter supplies are sometimes trucked further away from the front as they are moved to depots. The main problem the army has is congestion as cargo unloading proceeds at a faster rate than clearance from the port. As the supplies accumulate the US asks permission from the British to establish a major supply dump in the port. This is refused on the grounds it would hamper port clearance and set a precedent for US depots in other British army ports. It turns out the best site for a US dump is outside Antwerp, some 2,750,000 square feet of open storage near the Albert Canal. Drawing on the lessons from the Red Ball Express a set of instructions and responsibilities for truck haulage is issued.

On 3rd December the first US tanker docks at Antwerp.

By mid December Antwerp is handling over 30 US Army ships at a time, taking around 10 to 11 days to turn a ship around, unloading around 19,000 tons/day but clearances from the port is lower and 85,000 tons have accumulated, when a backlog of 15,000 tons was considered to hamper operations.

On 16th December the German Ardennes offensive begins. During the attack Antwerp will cease dispatching cargo for a time and supply trains and trucks in the front line will not be unloaded in order to keep supplies on wheels. The result is congestion reappears at Antwerp just as it had begun to clear and it will not be cleared again until well into January.

On 17th December one of the V1s targeted on Liege for the first and only times hits the US fuel dump, causing minor damage but burning 650,000 gallons of fuel.

On 23rd December The Albert canal is opened and will clear 15% of the tonnage landed at Antwerp during December. Due to the disruption of Antwerp and mindful of the Washington’s attitude to shipping backlogs the theatre requests cancellation of 24 sailings in the next convoys.

On 31st December a dump is opened at Lille to take overflow cargo from Antwerp. The withdrawal of transport due to the Ardennes offensive is claimed to have set back cargo clearance from Antwerp by the equivalent of 14,000 rail cars or 35 ships.

By January 1945 after initially bidding for 675,000 barrels of POL storage at Antwerp the US has 950,000 barrels of the 2,600,000 barrels at the port.

In January the workers at Antwerp will go on strike due to a lack of food, clothing and coal.

By the end of January the US POL pipeline from Antwerp to Maastricht is in service.

During February the Meuse thaws, as flood levels fall it can be used for barge traffic from Antwerp.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

I am reading this thread confused but with some amusement.
The idea of attacking aircraft on the ground was neither new nor stupid. The problem was in execution … Alternately, there was a plan of Galland, that has been cancelled.

I think there's another thing, the Luftwaffe was very taken with the idea of striking some big psychological blow that would make their enemies at least pause for a while. Bodenplatte and Galland's Großer Schlag were examples, also the plans for Eisenhammer (Soviet hydro-electric plants), Drachenhöhle (the Royal Navy at Scapa Flow) and Werwolf (Hajo Hermann's 7 April 1945 ramming operation).

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

I think there's another thing, the Luftwaffe was very taken with the idea of striking some big psychological blow that would make their enemies at least pause for a while. Bodenplatte and Galland's Großer Schlag were examples, also the plans for Eisenhammer (Soviet hydro-electric plants), Drachenhöhle (the Royal Navy at Scapa Flow) and Werwolf (Hajo Hermann's 7 April 1945 ramming operation).

Well, the question is, if the intention was to make a psychological blow, or rather to inflict losses of the enemy to an unacceptable level. This perfectly shows that Luftwaffe was unable to increase enemy losses by more traditional means. This would have been a very interesting topic to discuss with Pelz, but it is too late.

[Chris Goss]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

I think there's another thing, the Luftwaffe was very taken with the idea of striking some big psychological blow that would make their enemies at least pause for a while. Bodenplatte and Galland's Großer Schlag were examples, also the plans for Eisenhammer (Soviet hydro-electric plants), Drachenhöhle (the Royal Navy at Scapa Flow) and Werwolf (Hajo Hermann's 7 April 1945 ramming operation).

Sounds a bit like the thinking behind Unternehmen Gisela?