Impact of Allied fighter-bombers

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Tony
a) British even had a separate category for the slow and heavily armoured tank, Infantry tank. Have you never heard on Infantry Tank Mk II Matilda? First use in combat in May 40. Max armour thickness was 78mm when the German tanks at that time had max armour thickness of 30mm. Now Cruisers main problem was poor reliability and a gun which had optimized for anti-armour work but Cruisers armour protection was usually in same order than the German tanks they met, that means before Tiger and Panther and Panther's side armour was weak. But those late German tanks were much heavier and much more complicated than British and so needed much more materials and working hours to produce. It's true that between 1940 and late 44, so between A13 and Comet British Cruiser thanks were not as good as the best German tanks but majority of German tanks were not Tigers and Panthers during that time and with Tigers and Panthers one could not have made the dash through France and Belgium in August and Sept. 44, they were too unreliable for that.
Juha

Spot on. The Matilda must be high up in any analysis of what saved the BEF. The 37-mm Pak's shells bouncing off its 4-inch glacis panicked the Germans in the Arras counterattack and led to the halting of the Panzer divisions. It was also the key to destroying the Italian army in North Africa.

The problem was this. From D-Day onwards the Allies were attacking German defences equipped with the Dual Purpose 88-mm, as well as the 50-mm Pak. For the 50-mm Pak the army needed a tank with about 7-inches of frontal armour. The Churchill VII provided this, but almost all of them were removed from the Tank Brigades for turning into flamethrowing tanks, leaving them with Churchill IV with only six inches. For the 88-mm a tank was needed with 12-inches of vertical armour or less if sloped. This was never produced for two reasons. The armoured divisions were fixated on speed over armour (exactly the same discussion as the Typhoon versus the IL-2) and persuaded Montgomery to scrap the Churchill (which WSC refused to allow); and because the RAF took roughly half of all the resources in their abortive campaign to bomb German civilians to force Hitler to surrender there were never the resources to develop a decent infantry tank. Forget the armoured divisions - they were only interested in exploiting the mythical hole in the line to be punched by the infantry with their infantry tanks. (All numbers are from memory. Only the realationships are vouched for).

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

Tony
I am not sure what do you mean by Polish blood resources. Could you clarify?
Concerning Russian/Soviet experiences, they were actually born in Poland in 1920 when dare attacks of Polish Brisfits decimated and panicked Budenny's cavalry. Proper conclusion of this highly manouverable war were drawn and ground attack aircraft secured their place in Soviet aviation.

My whole life has been spent with a conscience about Poland, for whom we went to war and which we left in Stalin's grip. What the German enemy did to Poland was one thing, but what our Soviet Allies did was another thing entirely. My father never stopped talking about our failure towards Poland, and in Warwickshire where we lived in the 1970s there was a camp full of old Polish soldiers who walked three miles to the village church every Sunday. It was enough to make us cry.
If the British and Americans had not distorted their armed forces by following the grail of the strategic bomber, then perhaps - and this is of course a what if - a balanced and integrated all-arms force could have got to Warsaw before Uncle Joe.
The distortion caused by giving the RAF half of Britains resources was paid with in blood; the blood of Harris' aircrew, the blood of the British army, whose daily losses in Northwest Europe exceeded the daily losses in WWI, and the blood of the Poles occupied by pitiless Germans and equally pitiless Russians.
That's what I meant.

Tukhachevsky studied their invasion of Poland in 1920, but he also, remember, studied Arras 1918.

[Juha]

Sorry to say but Churchill VII had six inch frontal armour.
British army had armoured divisions but they also had army tank brigades for infantry support. No army had in service during the WWII tanks which were immune to 88mm L/71, so were all top military commnders idiots or were they able to see that some 78 - 100 tons monsters would have been impractical?

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Surely the 400mph Typhoon was vulnerable to the 452mph Bf109K, to the 472mph FwTa152C, to the 474 mph Ar335, and to the 541mph Me262. It was another myth, and RAF rationalisation, that the fighter-bomber could revert to being a fighter and defend itself. For a start the RP rails could not be jettisoned.

Pierre Clostermann flew the 440mph Tempest, and said this about the Typhoons' vulnerability in February 1945 in his book 'The Big Show'; "Typhoon formations frequently lost six or seven machines out of twelve in encounters with Fw190s and Bf109s. The Spitfire was powerless. It was to remedy this state of affairs that 122 Wing was sent to Volkel equipped with Tempests. It was a crack unit and on it depended the entire offensive and tactical system of the British front".

Maximum speeds like that are ideal figures for lightly-loaded aircraft (no ammunition) at given heights, all of which will be different, and there is no precise correlation with "real" combat. How about applying the "what actually happened test?"

In the air, the Typhoon was completely invulnerable to the Ar 234 which was unarmed apart from its bombs; there were never more than about 16 Ta 152s in service at any time, so they weren't much of a threat. Me 262s in tactical roles in the West were bomber and recon aircraft, which very occasionally brought down an Allied fighter but it was not their job. Which leaves the Fw 190 A-8/9 (the former not radically dissimilar in performance to a Typhoon, I think, but I'd need to check) the Fw 190 D-9 and the Bf 109 G-10, G-14 and K-4.

BTW, not all Typhoons carried RPs, many carried bombs.

Clostermann's book is a brilliant read, conveying how it all felt but far from reliable when it comes to what happened (see many previous posts). If you want some firmer numbers, check out the losses and claims by 2 TAF Typhoon, Spitfire (Mks. IX, XIV and XVI) and Tempest units (Shores & Thomas provide the necessary data). I think you'll find that all were getting kills right to the last and rarely if ever suffering losses on the dramatic scale Clostermann describes.

Also check out daily losses and claims by Luftwaffenkommando West (translated sitreps for February & March 1945 are available in the National Archives in the AIR20 series) which also include Flak claims some of the time. Units primarily engaged against 2 TAF were JG 26 and JG 27 while JG 2 and JG 53 faced the Americans for the most part. What comes home is how frequently German fighter formations were getting slaughtered for little or no success in return.

[Juha]

On Il-2. Out of curiosity checked the best sortie result of Finnish Hawk 75 (P-36) pilot against Il-2s and it was 1 1/3 by Ltn M. Joutsen in 15th June at 12.45-13.15 sortie. And Hawk 75s were armed at time with 1-2 12.7mm mgs (+ 2-5 rifle cal mgs). And there were suitable matches in Soviet losses, 2 Il-2s from 957 ShAP. Also Hillo and Ojapalo got 1/3 each. Now all Curtiss pilots whose oppinion I know admit that Il-2 was very, very difficult plane to shoot down with rather weak armament of Hawk 75 but it wasn't impossible. The few Hawk 75s seemed to have got 5 Il-2s altogether during summer 44.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Sorry to say but Churchill VII had six inch frontal armour.
British army had armoured divisions but they also had army tank brigades for infantry support. No army had in service during the WWII tanks which were immune to 88mm L/71, so were all top military commnders idiots or were they able to see that some 78 - 100 tons monsters would have been impractical?

I thought you'd say that - hence my disclaimer on the actual but not the relative values.
Churchill VII kept out the 50-mm Pak which killed cruiser tanks - Sherman, Cromwell, and Crusader.
The frontal armour needed to keep out the 88-mm could have been fitted on an upgraded Churchill. Take my word for it, or work it out for yourself; it was not impractical. I think I worked it out once that 10-inches or a foot was needed. A Churchill upgrade would have needed more hp (the Merlin would have done nicely) and it would have needed the beefed-up suspension system designed for the Black Prince. It was all possible, and if Montgomery had not been in command would probably have happened.
Tanks in the attack surrounded by infantry do not need heavy side and rear armour - just adequately thick frontal armour. An 88-mm in enfilade shooting through the thin side armour would then have been killed at leisure by the remaining oncoming Churchills.
The point you were making was the British had the Matilda. This point is worth making, surely, only because this slow Infantry tank was immune to the common Pak of the day - the 37-mm 'doorknocker'.
Using your own argument, the British army could have been expected to maintain its tank design so the infantry tank continued its invulnerability to the common Pak of the day, which in 1945 was the 88-mm. That was the gun all tankers feared. The Germans could not have fielded anything of larger calibre because they lacked the resources.
The 88-mm was a large target for a CAS aircraft. But in the battles I have studied, 2TAF's Typhoons did not go after it. The 88-mm was usually on a flank behind a building, invisible from the British front line. In 1918, one of the main tasks of CAS was to take out anti-tank guns. Not so in 1945. An RP Typhoon in any case had difficulty hitting a building let alone an 88-mm even if it could find it. An MG-42 could and did down a Typhoon, and there were always plenty of those (MG-42s).
Were all top commanders idiots? The British invented the tank and always had the best ones in WWI. Were they idiots then? Or were they rather fools in WWII for having the worst tanks?

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Surely the 400mph Typhoon was vulnerable to the 452mph Bf109K, to the 472mph FwTa152C, to the 474 mph Ar335, and to the 541mph Me262. It was another myth, and RAF rationalisation, that the fighter-bomber could revert to being a fighter and defend itself. For a start the RP rails could not be jettisoned.

Pierre Clostermann flew the 440mph Tempest, and said this about the Typhoons' vulnerability in February 1945 in his book 'The Big Show'; "Typhoon formations frequently lost six or seven machines out of twelve in encounters with Fw190s and Bf109s. The Spitfire was powerless. It was to remedy this state of affairs that 122 Wing was sent to Volkel equipped with Tempests. It was a crack unit and on it depended the entire offensive and tactical system of the British front".

Ar335????

Sure the 452mph Me109K-4s which only appeared in VERY small numbers (less than 100 total, maybe) from mid March 1945? Have you even looked at where the 4 Gruppen were based?

The Ta152C has already been mentioned in another post but you have confused it with the 152H of which only a staffel could be kept operational.

Clostermann likes to embelish his writtings so best to not to read to much into them. Going through the Typhoon loss list in the Thomas/Shores book I find 6 Typhoons lost with an enemy fighter reference and not all confirmed as by fighters. You need better references. Oh yes, Typhoons made 5 enemy fighter claims out of 18 claims during Feb 45

The Typhoon made 54:8 and 94:16 (claims: probable) against the 109 and 190 respectively. Seems the Typhoon did not do to bad against German fighters, especially the 190. Oh, and they also made 3 claims of Me262s.

[Graham Boak]

There is an excellent pair of books that give a full and at times acid account of the development of British tanks for and in WW2. There are times when it does indeed seem that those writing the requirements were foolish, and at other times clearly let down by the standards of British automotive production. I only have one of them, the second: I shall try to find the reference for you. They were published by HMSO, I recall.

One point to be remembered is the effect of the defeat of the BEF and the need to equip the remaining Army with anything available, leading to the retention in production of inferior types and almost a year of lost development. British tank design doesn't look quite so bad with a year's shift...not that this philosophical point helped the tankers.

However, the main thrust of the argument was not in favour of the kind of slow super-WW1 armoured monster you propose, which can indeed be seen in the prototype A33 and Black Prince, but for a single battle tank with a balance of armour, mobility and firepower, eventually arising as the Centurion. Tanks do not just require protection from the front - evidence for this can be seen in the up-armouring of the early Sherman for Normandy, with their applique over the vulnerable fuel tanks in the side sponsons. Tanks do not dash (or crawl) towards AT head on - at least not since futile attempts in the desert pre-Montgomery.

Most British armour could be penetrated by the 50mm PaK - similarly most German armour (still mainly the Mk.IV) by the 6 pdr. Or the heaviest by the 88mm - similarly the 17 pdr.

It is interesting to see that the Germans, who in WW2 designed for armour and firepower at the expense of mobility and reliability, changed to a more balanced tank (Leopard) postwar. They had seen the drawbacks of the armoured monsters and the advantages of a lighter design. Whereas the British followed the superb Centurion with the overweight super-gunned Chieftain, because they had seen the advantages of the heavy tank and the disadvantages of the lighter design. Both Armies/design teams had learned the lessons of history - just directly opposite ones. The Russians also abandoned their pursuit of super-heavies, despite the apparent success of the JS-2 "animal killers".

It's those awful compromises again........advantages have penalties, design is a matter of trade-offs. Tanks, aircraft, ships, cars, whatever. Stone scissors paper.....make your choice and roll your dice.

But if you really believe that a rocket couldn't hit a building, you really are misinformed. And the counterattack at Arras only stopped 7th Panzer for a day, with no effect on any other unit. Brave, and an interesting indication of what might have been achieved under other circumstances, but not by itself a roadmap for the future.

[Chris Thomas]

Just back from hols so missed most of this debate - but had to comment on this!

Originally Posted by tcolvin
Surely the 400mph Typhoon was vulnerable to the 452mph Bf109K, to the 472mph FwTa152C, to the 474 mph Ar335, and to the 541mph Me262. It was another myth, and RAF rationalisation, that the fighter-bomber could revert to being a fighter and defend itself. For a start the RP rails could not be jettisoned.

Pierre Clostermann flew the 440mph Tempest, and said this about the Typhoons' vulnerability in February 1945 in his book 'The Big Show'; "Typhoon formations frequently lost six or seven machines out of twelve in encounters with Fw190s and Bf109s. The Spitfire was powerless. It was to remedy this state of affairs that 122 Wing was sent to Volkel equipped with Tempests. It was a crack unit and on it depended the entire offensive and tactical system of the British front".

The first paragraph was just intended to be provocative (surely?). As Nick has pointed out 'maximum' speeds are not a particularly useful tool in comparing aircraft combat capabilities. What about manouverability, dive/climb speeds, roll rate, weapons, gunsights, abililty to survive damage, etc? The Typhoon could out-turn a Fw190 at low level, particularly if the Typhoon pilot dropped 10 degrees of flap.

As Nick also says, let the results speak for themeselves. At a quick count I reckon some 38 Typhoons were lost or believed to have been lost to German fighters in the air between D-Day and VE-Day. In the same period Typhoons were credited with 43 'confirmed' claims, including 17 Bf109, 15 Fw190 and 3 Me262 (I don't recall any 262 claims for Typhoons ....). 14 of these 35 claims for fighters were made by RP Typhoons the rest by bombers which were not encumbered by RP rails. The ratio of RP to bomber Typhoon squadrons was approximately 2 to 1.

I do like the correspondent's sense of humour, quoting 'The Big Show' as a statistical source. The statement about Typhoon losses would be correct only if you substituted 'never' for 'frequently'. The worst Typhoon loss in air combat occurred on 17 August 1944 when 8 Typhoons of 183 sqn were bounced by '50 plus' German fighters and lost four. There were a couple of other occasions when 3 were lost. Air to air combat with the Luftwaffe was relatively rare (I know one pilot who flew nearly 200 sorties during the period in question and never saw a Luftwaffe aircraft in the air), but when it did occur the Typhoon pilots could look after themselves as the above results show. The USAAF shot down more Typhoons in the first 3 months of 1945 than did the Luftwaffe ....

Re earlier posts, yes, the Typhoon was armoured. Mod 346 (55 lbs of fixed armour) and 347 (496 lbs of removable armour) were introduced in spring 1944. I am not sure of the exact disposition of this armour but photos show trial installations of sheet armour applied to the cockpit sides and floor and around the radiator. Nor do I know to what extent this armour was employed on operations. However many photos of Typhoons from D-day onwards show stencilling on the radiator fairings - "This fairing is armoured" - as a warning to groundcrew who might be removing the fairing.

[Jon]

When engaged in fighter v fighter combat the high speed of a particular type was of little use other than allowing the faster of the two a better chance of escape if he needed to. The Typhoon and P47 in a nose down attitude were able to use this to their advantage time after time. As for rocket rails and bomb racks causing the Typhoon trouble duing air to air combat well yes of course it caused trouble, my point is that a well flown Typhoon after taking out ground targets was still an aircraft very capable of defending its self. Again the Typhoon was by far the best Fighter Bomber of WW2, the Tempest should not even be mentioned in the same breath as it was a different aircraft with a totally different role. As for the Polish argument that is lurking in the back ground here, it happened, it was in the best interest for Britain and the US, that was why it happened and i must say that i feel it was the right thing to do at the time for Britain. Call me old fashioned but i still think your own country should come first above all others.