Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940

[Bruce Dennis]

"Some kids could believe that.... "


Ah, how nice to be mistaken for someone young.

Coastal convoys were predictable, but their composition was not. The Kreigsmarine were unable to spare craft for any meaningful recon, and there were no agents on shore radioing convoy details. Radio traffic was practically nonexistent among the ships and escorts, and the coastal routes covered hundreds of miles (not just the bit in front of Dover), German radar was not a factor, and that leaves the Mark 1 eyeball as the only solid source available to Luftwaffe Intelligence. It was only from human observation that the composition of the number, size and escort of a convoy, together with their position and formation could be reported, and this is what was happening. The orders posted by Junkers show that the rules were respected and followed by the Luftwaffe in the middle of June, but the events in question happened the following month after the decision to utilise the Seenot aircraft as spotters was initiated by orders from the highest command.

The British considered the coastal trade convoys too valuable to sacrifice, and the RAF were obligated to defend them. There was no viable alternative means of transport in Britain at this time of the war, so the convoys sailed with whatever escorts could be scraped together. The Luftwaffe used them in attempts to draw out the defending fighters. Both sides read basic R/T codes instantly in most cases from the Battle of France onwards, as these of necessity had to be simple and based on plain language. British Intelligence began reading higher level German traffic, including Enigma encoded messages, before the Munich Crisis.

And, of course, as explained earlier the WAAF listeners heard radio traffic from Seenot aircraft where there were no aircrew to be rescued. Whether these were marked with the Red Cross or not was beyond them to establish conclusively, but by June they were very good at knowing what units they were listening to. The reconciliation of the Y Service, radar and combat reports was usually completed by the night watch of Air Intelligence and hence available for the following day.

Bruce